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Introduction
In Citizens United vs. FEC,1 the Supreme Court struck down a Federal banning
direct corporate expenditures on political campaigns.2 The decision has been both
widely criticized and praised as a matter of First Amendment law.3 But it is also
interesting as another step in the evolution of our legal views of the corporation.4
The thesis of this Article is that by viewing Citizens United through the prism of
theories about the corporate form, it is possible to understand how both the
majority and the dissent departed from previous Supreme Court cases on the First
Amendment rights of corporations and to predict what arguments can be expected
next.
The corporation has evolved from its origins in Roman law through a
series of four major transformations. First, the concept of the corporation as a
separate legal person from its owners or members developed with the work of the
civil law Commentators in the fourteenth century.5 By the end of the Middle Ages,
the membership corporation—i.e., a corporation that had legal personality (the
capacity to own property, sue and be sued, and even bear criminal responsibility),
unlimited life, and in which members chose their successors—was well

1. 130 S.Ct. 876 (2010).
2. Id. at 917 (striking down 2 U.S.C § 441b (2006), which banned corporate-funded independent
expenditures).
3. See, e.g., Matt Bodie, Two Small Thoughts on Citizens United, PRAWFSBLAWG (Jan. 21, 2010,
6:13 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2010/01/two-small-thoughts-on-citizensunited.html; Ira Glasser, Understanding the Citizens United Ruling, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 3,
2010, 9:28 PM),
http://huffingtonpost.com/ira-glasser/understanding-the-emcitiz_b_447342.html;
Lawrence
Lessig, Institutional Integrity: Citizens United and the Path to a Better Democracy, HUFFINGTON
POST (Jan. 22, 2010, 3:15 PM), http:// www.huffingtonpost.com/lawrence-lessig/institutionalintegrity-c_b_433394.html? view=screen; Lawrence Lessig, The Democrats’ Response to
Citizens United: Not (Even Close to) Good Enough, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 15, 2010, 6:37
AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/Lawrence-lessig/the-democrats-responseto_b_462412.html?view=screen; Eugene Volokh, Citizens United and the Mainstream Media,
THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 21, 2010, 6:01 PM), http://volokh.com/2010/01/21/citizensunited-and-the-mainstream-media; Howard Wasserman, Further Thoughts on Citizens United,
PRAWFSBLAWG (Jan. 22, 2010, 8:15 AM),
http://prawfsblawg.bogs.com/prawfsblawg/2010/01/further-thoughts-on-citizens-united.html.
4. See generally Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Cyclical Transformations of the Corporate Form: A
Historical Perspective on Corporate Social Responsibility, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 767 (2005)
[hereinafter Avi-Yonah, Cyclical Transformations].
5. Id. at 780-82 (showing that by the time of Bartulos of Sassoferato (1314-1357), the leading
Commentator on the Corpus Juris Civilis in the fourteenth century, the concept of the
corporation as a separate legal person was fully developed).
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established in both civil and common law jurisdictions.6 The next important step
was the shift from non-profit membership corporations to for-profit business
corporations, which took place in England and the U.S. at the end of the
eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century.7 The third transformation
was the shift from closely held corporations to corporations whose shares are
widely held and publicly traded. This also included the rise of limited liability and
freedom to incorporate, which took place by the end of the nineteenth century and
the beginning of the twentieth century.8 Finally, the last major transformation was
from corporations doing business in one country to multinational enterprises
whose operations span the globe, which began after World War II and is still
ongoing.9
Each of these four transformations was accompanied by changes in the
legal conception of the corporation. What is remarkable, however, is that
throughout all of these changes, spanning two millennia, the same three theories
of the corporation can be discerned. Those theories are the aggregate theory,
which views the corporation as an aggregate of its members or shareholders; the
artificial entity theory, which views the corporation as a creature of the State; and
the real entity theory, which views the corporation as neither the sum of its owners
nor an extension of the state, but as a separate entity controlled by its managers.10
In this Article, I will first discuss how the three theories of the corporation
are reflected in our historical jurisprudence, and then I will show how Citizens
United fits within this tradition. Part I discusses the cyclical evolution of the three
corporate theories from the eighteenth century onward and shows that each
transformation brought forth all three theories, the real entity view always won
and was the established view during periods of stability. Part II applies this
analysis to Citizens United and its antecedents Bellotti and Austin, demonstrating
that all three theories arise in Bellotti and Austin, but that both the majority and the
dissent in Citizens United adopt the real entity view. Part III concludes by
predicting that the next confrontation will distinguish between domestic and
foreign corporations for First Amendment purposes, that all three theories will be
advanced, and that ultimately the real entity view will prevail in this context as
well.

6. See, eg., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *455-73 (describing the corporate form);

Avi-Yonah, Cyclical Transformations, supra note 4, at 783.
7. Avi-Yonah, Cyclical Transformations, supra note 4 at 785-86; see, e.g., JOSEPH ANGELL &

SAMUEL AMES, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS AGGREGATE, at v (1st ed.,
Boston, Hilliard, Gray, Little & Wilkins 1832).
8. Avi-Yonah, Cyclical Transformations, supra note 4, at 793-94.
9. Id. at 810-12.
10.These three are standard theories found in literature. See, e.g., David Millon, Theories of the
Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201.
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1. The Cyclical Evolution of Corporate Theories

11

1.1. From Nonprofit to For-Profit Corporations
By the time the American colonies declared themselves to be “free and
independent states,” the corporation was well established in English law as a
membership corporation, i.e., a corporation made up of members who selected
their own successors, like the President and Fellows of Harvard College still do
today. As such, a corporation had legal personality—the right to own property, sue
and be sued, act under a common seal, and other such “chestnuts.”12 Private
corporations were used primarily for nonprofit purposes (e.g., hospitals and
universities), but by the eighteenth century there were also some commercial ones
(e.g., the East India Company).13
There were two important limitations on corporations in this period. The
first was royal control over corporations; in England and other European countries
corporations could only be established by royal charter. Blackstone notes that
although in Roman law corporations could be established without “the prince’s
consent,” “with us in England, the king’s consent is absolutely necessary.”14
Second, some degree of outside control over management was established through
the institution of the committee of visitors, which represented the interests of the
founder and of the wider community.15
But other than in extraordinary cases, the real entity view of the
corporation prevailed throughout this period, and management (the members) was
firmly in control. “[A] corporation aggregate of many is invisible, immortal, and
rests only in intendment and consideration of the law . . . .”16 As such, it was a
self-perpetuating body subject to relatively little outside regulation. Corporations,
Blackstone notes, are “artificial persons, who may maintain a perpetual
succession, and enjoy a kind of legal immortality.”17 When the members

11.Part II is based on Avi-Yonah, Cyclical Transformations, supra note 4.
12.ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 17 (1986). For a discussion of how these basic features of

corporate legal personality were established, see Avi-Yonah, Cyclical Transformations, supra
note 4.
13.BLACKSTONE, supra note 6, at ch. XVIII (classifying and describing various corporations).
14.Id. at 460; Tipling v. Pexall, (1614) 80 Eng. Rep. 1085 (K.B.) 1085 (“the King creates them”);
see also The Case of Sutton’s Hospital (1612) 77 Eng. Rep. 960 (K.B) (providing an example of
a charter enumerating corporate legal rights).
15.BLACKSTONE, supra note 6, at *467-69.
16.The Case of Sutton’s Hospital (1612) 77 Eng. Rep. 960 (K.B) 973.
17.BLACKSTONE, supra note 6, at *455.

DOI: 10.2202/2152-2820.1048

Bro
ought to you by | Universsity of Michigan Law School
Authenticated | 141.211.57.157
Download Date | 1/17/14 9:17 PM

4

Avi-Yonah: Citizens United and the Corporate Form
are consolidated and united into a corporation, they and their
successors are then considered as one person in law: as one person,
they have one will, which is collected from the sense of the majority
of the individuals . . . for all the individual members that have existed
from the foundation to the present time, or that shall ever hereafter
18
exist, are but one person in law, a person that never dies . . . .

This “one person” then acquires all the rights of corporations, including
perpetual succession.19 The King constituted corporations, and the King or other
visitors exercised some degree of supervision over them, but once established the
corporation remained subject to relatively little outside regulation.20
This situation meant that corporate status was very desirable, especially
since the members also enjoyed limited liability for corporate debts.21 But the
English kings were very cautious with granting corporate charters, especially in
the case of for-profit enterprises; only corporations that were clearly vested with a
public purpose and benefited the public fisc, like the East India and Hudson Bay
Companies, received royal approval and accumulated vast power.22 As more
capital was required for commercial enterprises, promoters organized corporations
with transferable shares and claimed that under the authority of a lost or obsolete
charter the shareholders enjoyed limited liability.23 Then, after the South Sea
Bubble burst in 1720, this problem (and the desire of the East India Company to
retain its monopoly) led to the Bubble Act, under which it became a crime to
organize such corporations without explicit royal consent.24 Although prosecutions
under the Bubble Act were rare, it meant that the entire Industrial Revolution in
England (1760-1820) took place outside the corporate form and without limited
liability.25 The Bubble Act was ultimately repealed in 1825, after the Industrial
Revolution was over, but the provision of unlimited liability for shareholders
continued to be the rule in England until 1855.26
18.Id. at *456.
19.Id. at *463-64.
20.See generally Ron Harris, Industrializing English Law: Entrepreneurship and Business

Organization, 1720-1844 (2000) (discussing historical development of corporations in England).
21.Although this was not clear in the Roman sources, it was well established by Blackstone’s time

for royally chartered corporations. “The debts of a corporation, either to or from it, are totally
extinguished by its dissolution; so that the members thereof cannot recover, or be charged with
them, in their natural capacities.” BLACKSTONE, supra note 6, at *472.
22.See Harris supra note 20, at 43-49 (discussing colonial corporations).
23.Id. at 127-32.
24.Bubble Act, 1719, 6 Geo. 1, c. 18 (Gr. Brit.); see Harris, supra note 20.
25.For attempts to avoid the Bubble Act which led to prosecutions, see The King v. Webb, (1811)
104 Eng. Rep. 658; The King v. Dodd, (1808) 103 Eng. Rep. 670 (K.B); see Harris, supra note
19, at 78-79.
26.Bubble Act Repeal, 1825, 6 Geo. 4, c. 91 (UK); Limited Liability Act, 1855, 18 & 19 Vict. c.
133 (UK.).
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This situation, which can be seen as a way of maintaining state control
over corporations through restrictions on charters, meant that the next great shift
in the use of corporate form took place in the fledgling United States. There, once
the revolution was over, every state could issue corporate charters.27 The result
was an explosion of charters for commercial enterprises.28 Joseph Angell and
Samuel Ames’s wrote one of the first treatises on corporate law, Treatise on the
Law of Private Corporations Aggregate, published in Boston in 1832.29 Angell
and Ames begin their book by stating:
The reader does not require to be told, that we have in our country an
infinite number of corporations aggregate, which have no concern
whatever with affairs of a municipal nature. These associations we not
only find scattered throughout every cultivated part of the United
States, but so engaged are they in all the varieties of useful pursuit,
that we see them directing the concentration of mind and capital to . . .
the encouragement and extension of the great interests of commerce,
agriculture, and manufactures. There is a great difference in this
respect between our own country, and the country from which we have
derived a great portion of our laws. What is done in England by
combination, unless it be the management of municipal concerns, is
most generally done by a combination of individuals, established by
mere articles of agreement. On the other hand, what is done here by
the co-operation of several persons, is, in the greater number of
instances, the result of a consolidation effected by an express act or
30
charter of incorporation.

The main reason for this proliferation of corporations in the United States
was the second great transformation in the role of the corporation in society from
primarily a nonprofit to primarily a for-profit enterprise. As Judge Kent stated:

27.See Angell & Ames, supra note 7, at 35. For general discussions of state corporate charters, see

Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law 177-202 (1985); Kermit L. Hall et al.,
American Legal History: Cases and Materials 115-17 (1991); Morton J. Horwitz, The
Transformation of American Law 1780-1860, at 63-139 (1977).
28.ANGELL AND AMES, supra note 7, at 35.
29.Angell and Ames’s work was preceded by the English work of Stewart Kyd, published in
London in 1793, but that treatise was devoted primarily to municipal corporations. See ANGELL
& AMES, supra note 7, at vi. The Angell and Ames treatise was very successful, with eleven
editions published through 1882.
30.Id. at v; see also id. at 35 (“In no country have corporations been multiplied to so great an
extent, as in our own . . . . There is scarcely an individual of respectable character in our
community, who is not a member of, at least, one private company or society which is
incorporated. . . . . Acts of incorporation are moreover continually solicited at every session of
the legislature . . . .”).
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[T]he multiplication of corporations in the United States, and the
avidity with which they are sought, have arisen in consequence of the
power which a large and consolidated capital gives them over business
of every kind; and the facility which the incorporation gives to the
management of that capital, and the security which it affords to the
persons of its members, and to their property not vested in the
31
corporate stock.

This was a profound shift, and not surprisingly it led to a revival of the
centuries-old debate about the nature of the corporate form and its relationship to
the shareholders and the state. This debate can be seen if we examine the opinions
on the subject issued by the first great American jurist, John Marshall. Three of
Marshall’s opinions, written decades apart, are particularly relevant here: Bank of
the United States v. Deveaux,32 Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,33 and
Bank of the United States v. Dandridge.34 These opinions represent the evolution
of his thinking on corporations, which moved from the aggregate view, Deveaux,
to the artificial entity view Dartmouth College to the real entity view Dandridge.
Deveaux involved an attempt by the state of Georgia to tax the Savannah
branch of the Bank of the United States, a corporation established by Congress in
1791, as part of the early struggles around federalism.35 The Bank was a
membership corporation (“The president, directors and company of the bank of
the United States”) and all the members were citizens of Pennsylvania.36 The Bank
refused to pay the tax, and the State sent its collectors to enforce payment,
whereupon the Bank sued the collectors in federal court, claiming diversity
jurisdiction.37 The issue facing the court was whether a corporation made up of
members from one state could sue citizens of another state in federal court on
diversity grounds. This in turn required deciding between the view that “the
individual character of the members is so wholly lost in that of the corporation,
that the court cannot take notice of it,” and the contrary view that “a corporation is
composed of natural persons,” that is, between the entity (artificial or real) and
aggregate views.38
Marshall decided in favor of the aggregate view. He stated that the
corporation itself, “that mere legal entity,” cannot be a citizen or sue in federal

31.Id. at 36 (quoting 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 219 (New York City, O.

Halsted 1827). The last sentence refers to limited liability, which will be discussed below.
32.9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809).
33.17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
34.25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 64 (1827) (Marshall, C.J., dissenting).
35.Deveaux, 9. U.S. (5 Cranch) at 63, 73.
36.Id. at 74.
37.Id. at 63.
38.Id. at 63-64.
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court unless it can be regarded as “a company of individuals.”39 However, since
the reasons that led Congress to enact diversity jurisdiction applied to corporations
as well, Marshall was inclined to see the controversy as being between the
members “suing in their corporate character” and their opponents.40 “The
controversy is substantially between aliens, suing by a corporate name, and a
citizen . . . in this case the corporate name represents persons who are members of
the corporation.”41 The Court therefore held that federal jurisdiction existed.
Ten years later Marshall was faced with another difficult issue involving
corporations. In the famous Dartmouth College 42 case, the state of New
Hampshire attempted to alter the charter of Dartmouth College (incorporated as a
membership corporation by George III in 1769, under the name of The Trustees of
Dartmouth College),43 by transferring the appointment of trustees to the state,
thereby effectively taking it over.44 The trustees objected, arguing that the charter
constituted a contract and that altering it violated the Contracts Clause of the
Constitution.45
Marshall held that as the College was a private corporation, its charter was
a contract and was protected by the contracts clause.46 He began by noting that
neither the funds for the College, which came from private sources, or its
educational character made it a public corporation.47 He then got to the heart of the
issue—whether the act of incorporation by the state makes it possible for the state
to take it over. In frequently quoted language, Marshall held that “[a] corporation
is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of
law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which the
charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very
existence.”48
This language reflects the artificial entity view of the corporation. Marshall
then went on to note that, having created the corporation, the state may not treat it
as a mere extension of itself: “this being does not share in the civil government of
the country, unless that be the purpose for which it was created.”49 Even though its
object is to promote governmentally approved aims, this does not make
corporations into mere instruments of government. Instead, the corporation exists
39.Id. at 86-87.
40.Id. at 87-88.
41.Id. at 91.
42.17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 518.
43.Id. at 518-25.
44.Id. at 626.
45.Id. at 588-89.
46.Id. at 650.
47.Id. at 635.
48.Id. at 636.
49.Id.
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to represent the interest of the founder and his descendants in the aims for which it
was founded. In the United States, this interest is protected by the contracts clause,
although in England, Marshall recognized, Parliament had the power to annul the
charter.50 In this country “the body corporate, as possessing the whole legal and
equitable interest, and completely representing the donors, for the purpose of
executing the trust, has rights which are protected by the constitution.”51
It should be noted that while Marshall held that the state may not take over
a private corporation, even one founded for public ends, the emphasis on the
artificial nature of the corporation left ample room for state regulation via the
original charter. Since states were busy granting charters by the hundreds, the
Dartmouth opinion thus enabled the states to regulate corporations, should they
wish to do so.
Finally, six years later, Marshall was once more called to opine on the
nature of corporations in another case involving the Bank of the United States.52
Dandridge involved a suit by the Bank, regarding a bond executed by one of its
cashiers, in which the defendant argued that the bond had never been approved by
the Board of Directors, as required by the charter of incorporation. The key issue
was whether the level of evidence required of corporations was higher than that
required of individuals, since corporations are incapable of acting without
writing.53 Justice Story, writing for the Court, held that no distinction should be
made: “The same presumptions are . . . applicable to corporations.”54 Marshall,
however, dissented. He argued that
The corporation being one entire impersonal entity, distinct from the
individuals who compose it, must be endowed with a mode of action
peculiar to itself, which will always distinguish its transactions from
those of its members. This faculty must be exercised according to its
55
own nature . . . This can be done only by writing.

The Court’s view was the more pragmatic one, but Marshall’s view was
more consistent with the real entity view of the corporation as distinct from its
members, individually or collectively. It certainly forms an interesting contrast
with the views he expressed in the Deveaux case sixteen years earlier.
How can one explain the shift in Marshall’s view of the corporation from
aggregate (Deveaux) to artificial (Dartmouth College) to real (Dandridge)? In
part, it stems from the circumstances of these particular cases. In Deveaux,
50.Id. at 643.
51.Id. at 654.
52.Bank of the U.S. v. Dandridge, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 64 (1825) (Marshall, C.J., dissenting).
53.Id. at 65-67.
54.Id. at 70.
55.Id. at 91-92 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting).
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Marshall wanted to confer diversity jurisdiction to protect a federal institution (he
was, after all, a Federalist), and the only way to do so was to look through the
corporation to its members. In Dartmouth College, the issue involved the
relationship of private corporations (albeit “imbued with a public purpose,” the
full-fledged private/public distinction had not yet evolved) to the state, and thus
Marshall emphasized the role of the state in creating the corporation, while
placing clear limits on its ability to regulate corporations thereafter. These limits
were required as the result of the proliferation of corporations, especially forprofit business corporations, since otherwise the state would be able to take over
purely private businesses. In practice, the result in Dartmouth College favored the
real entity view: once a private corporation was created, it could no longer be
taken over—or perhaps even overly regulated—by the state. Thus, it may not be
surprising that by the time he came to write his Dandridge dissent Marshall took
the real entity view, even though it contradicted his opinion in Deveaux (which
was not mentioned).
Two important legal developments during the same period strengthened
the real entity view and weakened the aggregate and artificial entity views of the
corporation: the rise of limited liability and the spread of general incorporation
laws. Limited liability weakened the aggregate view, and general incorporation
weakened the artificial entity view. First, limited liability: As we have seen in
England, limited liability did not exist for corporations until 1855.56 In the United
States, however, most states adopted limited liability in the 1830s.57 In their first
edition, Angell and Ames explain the primary distinction between a partnership
and a corporation:
In every private unincorporated company, the members are liable for
the debts without limitation; whereas in incorporated societies, they
are only liable to the extent of their shares . . . . It is frequently the
principal object, in this and in other countries, in procuring an act of
incorporation, to limit the risk of the partners to their shares in the
stock of the association; and prudent men are always backward in
taking stock, when they become mere copartners as regards their
58
personal liability for the company debts.

56.Phillip I. Blumberg, The Multinational Challenge To Corporation Law 17 (1993).
57.Id. at 10-12.
58.ANGELL & AMES, supra note 7, at 23; see also id., at 349 (“No rule of law, we believe, is better

settled, than that, in general, the individual members of a private corporate body are not liable for
the debts.”); id. at 36 (citing a quote from Judge Kent emphasizing limited liability as a reason to
incorporate).
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When Angell and Ames wrote this, limited liability was by no means a
universally established rule for corporations;59 the authors were thus trying to
establish the law as much as describe the law that existed. Their main argument,
familiar from current debates on limited liability,60 was that “[t]he public,
therefore, gain by acts incorporating trading associations, as by such means
persons are induced to hazard a certain amount of property for the purposes of
trade and public improvement, who would abstain from so doing, were not their
liability thus limited.”61
Eventually this argument won the day, and by 1840 most of the states had
established limited liability.62
Limited liability, in turn, led to a decline in the emphasis on the aggregate theory,
because the aggregate view of corporations tended to reduce the distinction
between the corporation and its members or shareholders, which is at the heart of
limited liability.63
The decline of the aggregate view can clearly be seen in two cases from
the period of 1839 to 1844, in which the Supreme Court repudiated Marshall’s
opinion in Deveaux. In Bank of Augusta v. Earle 64 the Court held that a
corporation incorporated by Georgia could execute a valid contract in Alabama on
comity grounds.65 However, the Court rejected the argument that Alabama was
required to accept the contract on the basis that the Privileges and Immunities
Clause applied directly to the corporation’s members (as required by the aggregate

59.BLUMBERG, supra note 56, at 10.
60.See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest, The Limited Future of Unlimited Liability: A Capital Markets

Perspective, 102 YALE L.J. 387 (1992); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Do the Capital
Markets Compel Limited Liability?: A Response to Professor Grundfest, 102 YALE L.J. 427
(1992); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for
Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879 (1991); Nina A. Mendelson, A Control-Based Approach to
Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1203 (2002).
61.ANGELL & AMES, supra note 7, at 24; see also id. at 362 (arguing that states who pursue the
contrary policy, like Massachusetts, “drive millions of capital into the neighboring states for
investment”—an early instance of a “race” (to the top or bottom)).
62.This was subject to one limitation, the “trust fund” doctrine, which said that the capital stock of
a corporation was to be held in trust to pay corporate debts and thus could not be distributed to
shareholders while debts were outstanding. See Wood v. Dummer, 30 F. Cas. 435 (D. Me. 1824).
63.See generally Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for
Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387 (2003) (arguing that the
main purpose of incorporation in the nineteenth century was to “lock in” capital in the firm
because shareholders could not force distributions in exchange for limited liability); Henry
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387,
393 (2000) (describing the “core defining characteristic of a legal entity” as the “partitioning off
of a separate set of assets in which the creditors of the firm have a prior security interest”).
64.38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839).
65.Id. at 585, 596.
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view), stating that Deveaux had never been extended that far.66 Chief Justice
Taney emphasized that he rejected the aggregate view because of its implications
for limited liability, as well as the implications for state regulation of the
corporations:
The result of this [aggregate view] would be to make the corporation a
mere partnership in business, in which each stockholder would be
liable to the whole extent of his property for the debts of the
corporation . . . . Besides, it would deprive every state of all control
over the extent of corporate franchises proper to be granted in the State
67
....

In Louisville, Cincinnati, and Charleston Railroad Co. v. Letson,68 decided
in 1844, the Court explicitly limited Deveaux to its facts, holding that diversity
jurisdiction may arise even when some of the members of a defendant corporation
are citizens of the same state as the plaintiff.69 The Court stated that the Deveaux
results “have never been satisfactory to the bar” and that a corporation “seems to
us to be a person, though an artificial one, inhabiting and belonging to that State
[of incorporation], and therefore entitled, for the purpose of suing and being sued,
to be deemed a citizen of that State.”70
This result was required by the proliferation of business corporations
having many shareholders in many states, as opposed to the membership
corporations of Marshall’s early days. As Angell and Ames state, by 1832 “[j]oint
stock companies are composed of persons who seldom know any thing of the
business of the company, but who leave the management of it entirely to the board
of directors, and are contented with receiving such periodical dividends as the
directors think proper to make.”71 The separation of management from ownership,
and the rise of limited liability, rendered the aggregate view implausible.72

66.Id. at 586-87.
67.Id.
68.43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844).
69.Id. at 554-55.
70.Id. at 555. See also Marshall v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 328 (1853)

(holding that for diversity purposes a corporation should be deemed a resident of its place of
incorporation). This led to the current rule, adopted in 1958, under which a corporation is for
diversity purposes a citizen of both the state in which it is incorporated and the state in which it
has its principal place of business. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2006).
71.ANGELL & AMES, supra note 7, at 32 (emphasis omitted).
72.See Chief Justice Shaw’s statement:
A board of directors of the banks of Massachusetts is a body recognized by law. By the by-laws
of these corporations, and by a usage, so general and uniform as to be regarded as part of the law
of the land, they have the general superintendence and active management of all the concerns of
the bank, and constitute, to all purposes of dealing with others, the corporation.”
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Second, general incorporation: In the 1820s and 1830s the granting of
corporate charters by state legislatures became a process fraught with corruption.73
Some Jacksonians reacted by advocating elimination of the rights of states to grant
corporate charters.74 But the corporate form was so widely used that this was
impracticable; instead, laws were passed in all the states permitting anyone to
form a corporation on payment of a fee without permission by the state
legislature.75 This democratizing move meant that the artificial entity theory, under
which the corporation derives its powers from the state, lost most of its appeal,
since the state was only vestigially involved in creating corporations. Instead,
corporations were viewed as separate from both their shareholders and the state,
and the real entity view reigned supreme.76

1.2. From Closely Held to Widely Held Corporations
The situation between the 1820s and the end of the Civil War was thus the
proliferation of for-profit corporations, incorporated under general incorporation

Burrill v. Nahant Bank, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 163, 166-67 (1840) (emphasis added). It is hard to
imagine a clearer rejection of the aggregate view. See also Hoyt v. Thompson’s Executor, in
which the New York Court of Appeals held
[I]n corporate bodies the powers of the board of directors are, in a very important sense, original
and undelegated. The stockholders do not confer, nor can they revoke those powers. They are
derivative only in the sense of being received from the State in the act of incorporation. The
directors convened as a board are the primary possessors of all the powers which the charter
confers, and like private principals they may delegate to agents of their own appointment the
performance of any acts which they themselves can perform. The recognition of this principle is
absolutely necessary in the affairs of every corporation whose powers are vested in a board of
directors. Without it the most ordinary business could not be carried on, and the corporate
powers could not be executed.
19 N.Y. (5 Smith) 207, 216 (1859). This constitutes a recognition that the aggregate view derived
from the membership corporation could not be maintained as a practical matter in corporations
with hundreds or thousands of shareholders, as already existed in the 1850s.
73.See Angell & Ames, supra note 7, at 35-36; James W. Hurst, The Legitimacy of the Business
Corporation in the Law of the United States, 1780-1970, at 33-36 (1970); Marvin Meyers, The
Jacksonian Persuasion: Politics and Belief 201 (1957).
74.Hurst, supra note 73, at ___; Meyers, supra note 73, at ___.
75.See, e.g., Act Relating to Joint Stock Corporations, 1837 Conn. Pub. Acts 49, 49 (permitting
incorporation of any “lawful” business); Nesmith v. Sheldon, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 812, 817-18
(1849); see also President Jackson’s veto of the second bank of the United States: “[i]f [the
government] would confine itself to equal protection, and, as Heaven does its rains, shower its
favors alike on the high and the low, the rich and the poor, it would be an unqualified blessing,”
Andrew Jackson, Veto Message, in 2 Messages and Papers of the Presidents 576, 590 (1896).
76. The same result was obtained in England by the adoption of the Joint Stock Companies Act,
1856, 19 & 20 Vict. c. 47 (U.K.).
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laws with minimal interference by the state and with shareholders who enjoyed
limited liability. Those shareholders were, however, relatively few in number;
despite the Angell and Ames quotation above,77 few corporations before 1865
required massive amounts of capital, and most were small, closely held
enterprises.78 This enabled the Civil War income tax on corporate income to be
imposed directly on the shareholders of corporations.79
This state of affairs began to change with the advent of the railroads,
followed by the steel and oil companies. With the rise of large corporate
enterprises, massive amounts of capital were required, and between 1865 and the
1890s the widely held, publicly traded, non-owner managed enterprise gradually
became the norm for U.S. business activities.80 This was followed from 1890 to
1906 by a wave of consolidation that left several important business areas
dominated by monopolies run by the Robber Barons.81
The shift from small, closely held enterprises to massive, publicly held
ones once again necessitated a re-examination of the corporate form, and again all
three theories of the corporation appear. A classic example of the aggregate view
is Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co.,82 ultimately decided by
the Supreme Court in 1886. This case is famous for Chief Justice Waite’s
statement that “[t]he court does not wish to hear argument on the question whether
the [Equal Protection Clause] . . . applies to these corporations. We are all of the
opinion that it does.”83 Some scholars identified this as an application of the real
entity view to corporations,84 but Professor Horwitz has shown, by examining
Justice Field’s opinion in the court below, that it actually represented an
application of the aggregate view.85 Specifically, Field held that the Equal
Protection Clause must apply to corporations for the following reasons:
[P]rivate corporations consist of an association of individuals united
for some lawful purpose, and permitted to use a common name in their
business and have succession of membership without dissolution . . . .
But the members do not, because of such association, lose their right
to protection, and equality of protection. . . .

77. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
78.Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, “Corporations, Society, and the State: A Defense of the Corporate Tax”,
90 Va. L. Rev. 1193, 1213 (2004) [hereinafter Avi-Yonah, Corporations].
79.Id.
80.Id. at 1227, 1232.
81.Id. at 1227.
82.118 U.S. 394 (1886).
83.Id. at 396. See Morton J. Horwitz, “Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate
Theory”, 88 W. Va. L. Rev. 173, 173-74 (1985).
84.Horwitz, supra note 82, at 178.
85.Id. at 174, 177-78, 223.

DOI: 10.2202/2152-2820.1048

Bro
ought to you by | Universsity of Michigan Law School
Authenticated | 141.211.57.157
Download Date | 1/17/14 9:17 PM

14

Avi-Yonah: Citizens United and the Corporate Form
Whatever affects the property of the corporation—that is, of all the
members united by the common name—necessarily affects their
interests. . . . So, therefore, whenever a provision of the constitution or
of a law guaranties to persons protection in their property . . . the
benefits of the provision . . . are extended to corporations; not to the
name under which different persons are united, but to the individuals
composing the union. The courts will always look through the name to
86
see and protect those whom the name represents.

A clearer statement of the aggregate view can hardly be imagined; most
remarkable is Field’s reliance on Deveaux despite the fact that the Supreme Court
overturned its results forty years earlier.87 Similarly, in Pembina Mining Co. v.
Pennsylvania,88 decided two years later, Justice Field stated that, “[u]nder the
designation of person there is no doubt that a private corporation is included. Such
corporations are merely associations of individuals united for a special purpose.”89
However, the artificial entity view was also raised in these cases. In Santa
Clara, the railroad corporations made the argument that because they were
operating under special congressional legislation, they should be regarded as an
extension of the federal government and therefore California could not tax them.90
Field rejected this view (citing Dartmouth College), but noted that “when the
instrumentality is the creation of the state,—a corporation formed under its
laws,—and is employed or adopted by the general government for its convenience
. . . it remains subject to the taxing power of the state.”91 And notably, in Pembina,
Field followed Taney in rejecting the argument that the Privileges and Immunities
Clause applied to corporations because they were not “citizens,” even though the
aggregate view he adopted in Santa Clara might have led to the contrary
position.92 Instead, Field emphasized the relationship between the corporation and
the incorporating state under the artificial entity view:
[T]he term citizens, as used in the clause, applies only to natural
persons, members of the body politic owing allegiance to the State, not
to artificial persons created by the legislature, and possessing only
such attributes as the legislature has prescribed . . . a grant of corporate
existence was a grant of special privileges to the corporators, enabling
them to act for certain specified purposes as a single individual, and
86.Cnty. of Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 18 F. 385, 402-03 (D. Cal. 1883).
87.Id. at 403.
88.Pembina Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181 (1888).
89.Id. at 189. See also Mason v. Pewabic Mining Co., 133 U.S. 50, 59 (1890) (“We do not see that

the rights of the parties in regard to the assets of this corporation differ from those of a
partnership on its dissolution.”).
90.Santa Clara, 18 F. at 387.
91.Id. at 389.
92.Pembina, 125 U.S. at 187.
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exempting them, unless otherwise provided, from individual
93
liability.

Moreover, all three views of the corporation appear in Hale v. Henkel,94
decided by the Supreme Court in 1906. The issue was whether an agent of a
corporation could invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination or the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable search
and seizure in the name of the corporation.95 On the Fifth Amendment issue, the
Court held that the right against self-incrimination did not apply to corporations:
The right of a person under the Fifth Amendment to refuse to
incriminate himself is purely a personal privilege of the witness . . . .
The question whether a corporation is a “person” within the meaning
of this Amendment really does not arise . . . since it can only be heard
96
by oral evidence in the person of some one of its agents or employés.

This is closest to the real entity view, since it rejects (like Marshall in
Dandridge) the aggregate position of looking through a corporation to its
shareholders and takes into account the special characteristics of the corporation
itself.
On the other hand, regarding the Fourth Amendment question, the Court at
first emphasized the artificial entity view, using it to justify regulation by the state:
Conceding that the witness was an officer of the corporation under
investigation, and that he was entitled to assert the rights of the
corporation with respect to the production of its books and papers, we
are of the opinion that there is a clear distinction in this particular
between an individual and a corporation, and that the latter has no
right to refuse to submit its books and papers for an examination at the
suit of the State. The individual may stand upon his constitutional
rights as a citizen. . . .
Upon the other hand, the corporation is a creature of the State. It is
presumed to be incorporated for the benefit of the public. It receives
certain special privileges and franchises, and holds them subject to the
laws of the State and the limitations of its charter. Its powers are
limited by law. It can make no contract not authorized by its charter.
Its rights to act as a corporation are only preserved to it so long as it
obeys the laws of its creation. There is a reserved right in the
legislature to investigate its contracts and find out whether it has
exceeded its powers. It would be a strange anomaly to hold that a
State, having chartered a corporation to make use of certain franchises,
93.Id. at 187-88.
94. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
95.Id. at 51.
96.Id. at 69-70.
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could not in the exercise of its sovereignty inquire how these
franchises had been employed, and whether they had been abused, and
demand the production of the corporate books and papers for that
purpose . . . . While an individual may lawfully refuse to answer
incriminating questions unless protected by an immunity statute, it
does not follow that a corporation, vested with special privileges and
franchises, may refuse to show its hand when charged with an abuse of
97
such privileges.

However, having clearly stated its reasons for limiting the application of
the constitutional right, the Court suddenly reverted back to the aggregate view
when faced with the question of whether corporations have any Fourth
Amendment rights at all:
[W]e do not wish to be understood as holding that a corporation is not
entitled to immunity, under the Fourth Amendment, against
unreasonable searches and seizures. A corporation is, after all, but an
association of individuals under an assumed name and with a distinct
legal entity. In organizing itself as a collective body it waives no
constitutional immunities appropriate to such body. Its property cannot
be taken without compensation. It can only be proceeded against by
due process of law, and is protected, under the Fourteenth
Amendment, against unlawful discrimination. Corporations are a
necessary feature of modern business activity, and their aggregated
98
capital has become the source of nearly all great enterprises.

What can explain this remarkable oscillation between the three views? The
key is the last sentence quoted. As noted above, the period between 1890 and
1906 marked the height of the debate on the rise of the great corporations. The
Court is trying to strike a balance between the rights of the corporations, which
97.Id. at 74-75. Remarkably, the court applied this analysis to give powers to the federal

government over state corporations:
It is true that the corporation in this case was chartered under the laws of New Jersey, and that it
receives its franchise from the legislature of that State; but such franchises, so far as they involve
questions of interstate commerce, must also be exercised in subordination to the power of
Congress to regulate such commerce, and in respect to this the General Government may also
assert a sovereign authority to ascertain whether such franchises have been exercised in a lawful
manner, with a due regard to its own laws. Being subject to this dual sovereignty, the General
Government possesses the same right to see that its own laws are respected as the State would
have with respect to the special franchises vested in it by the laws of the State. The powers of the
General Government in this particular in the vindication of its own laws, are the same as if the
corporation had been created by an act of Congress. It is not intended to intimate, however, that it
has a general visitatorial power over state corporations.
Id. at 75. This issue came up in the corporate tax debate as well. Avi-Yonah, Corporations, supra
note 78, at 1214-19.
98.Hale, 201 U.S. at 76 (emphasis removed) (citation omitted).
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can best be protected under either the aggregate or the real entity views, and the
regulatory power of the state, which is best reflected in the artificial entity view.
On the one hand, as the Court states, “[c]orporations are a necessary feature of
modern business activity” and must be protected.99 On the other hand, the right of
the state to regulate must also be preserved, especially since the context of Hale
was an antitrust investigation into two major corporations, the American Tobacco
Company and McAndrews & Forbes Inc.
Ultimately, however, the real entity view prevailed.100 This first involved
the rejection of the aggregate view. For example, in Western Turf Ass’n v.
Greenberg,101 decided just one year after Hale, Justice Harlan emphasized that a
corporation is a separate entity from its shareholders, and therefore it is not a
“citizen” for purposes of the Privileges and Immunities Clause or entitled to the
protection of the due process clause: “the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment against deprivation without due process of law is the liberty of
natural, not artificial, persons.”102 But by itself this position would have led to too
much state regulation for the Lochner Court. Thus, in Southern Railway Co. v.
Greene,103 decided in 1909, the Court came out clearly for the position that the
corporation as such was entitled to constitutional protection under the Equal
Protection Clause, without any reference to its shareholders: “the corporation . . .
is within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, a person within the
jurisdiction of the State of Alabama, and entitled to be protected against any
statute of the State which deprives it of the equal protection of the laws.”104
Once again, the triumph of the real entity view can be explained by several
factors. The aggregate view was raised by Field and others to protect the rights of
corporations, but it was even more incongruous in the context of the mega99.Id.
100.This view was also reflected in contemporary books and law review articles. See, e.g., ERNST

FREUND, THE LEGAL NATURE OF CORPORATIONS 81-83 (1897); George F. Deiser, The Juristic
Person, 57 U. PA. L. REV. & AM. L. REG. 131, 131-133 (1908); Harold J. Laski, The Personality
of Associations, 29 HARV. L. REV. 404, 413 (1916); Arthur W. Machen, Jr., Corporate
Personality, 24 HARV. L. REV. 253, 261-62 (1911); I. Maurice Wormser, Piercing the Veil of
Corporate Entity, 12 COLUM. L. REV. 496, 516 (1912) (all rejecting the aggregate view). But see
VICTOR MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS OTHER THAN
CHARITABLE 2 (1882) (supporting the aggregate view, stating that “the existence of a corporation
independently of its shareholders is a fiction”).
101.204 U.S. 359 (1907).
102.Id. at 363.
103.216 U.S. 400 (1910).
104.Id. at 417. Remarkably this case involves a discriminatory state tax similar to the one struck
down by Field on aggregate grounds in W. Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 36 (1910);
Pullman Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 56, 64 (1910) (White, J., concurring) See also Ludwig v. W.
Union Tel. Co., 216 U.S. 146, 157 (1910) (eliminating the restrictions imposed by Bank of
Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519 (1839)); see also, Horwitz, supra note 82.
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corporations of the 1890s, with thousands of shareholders, than in the pre–Civil
War days. It also gave the corporation too many rights vis-a-vis the state, as seen
in Hale and in Greenberg. The artificial entity view gave the state too much power
to regulate corporations, as the Hale court came to realize when it laid out its
implications. The real entity view was most congruent with business realities as
well as the one most suited to a corporation-state balance. By 1909, it was well
established as the dominant view of the corporation, as reflected in contemporary
debates surrounding the enactment of the corporate tax.105
The rise of the real entity view is also reflected in two other contemporary
developments: the rise of the business judgment rule and the decline of the ultra
vires doctrine.106 The business judgment rule rejected the aggregate view in
holding that the board of directors possessed powers that were not delegated from
the shareholders and that shareholders could not normally call into question the
exercise of those powers. The ultra vires doctrine represented the ability of the
state to require corporations to adhere to their charter, and was thus based on the
artificial entity view; its decline thus reinforced the rejection of that view.
The first full statement of the business judgment rule was made in Leslie v.
Lorillard,107 decided by the New York Court of Appeals in 1888. The court held
In actions by stockholders, which assail the acts of their directors or
trustees, courts will not interfere unless the powers have been illegally
or unconscientiously executed . . . . Mere errors of judgment are not

105.See Avi-Yonah, Corporations, supra note 78.
106.Another related development was the strengthening of limited liability resulting from the

demise of the “trust fund” doctrine, which held that the capital stock of a corporation must be
held in trust for the benefit of its creditors. This doctrine, which originated from Justice Story’s
opinion in Wood v. Dummer, 30 F. Cas. 435, 436-37 (D. Me. 1824), was upheld by the Supreme
Court in Sawyer v. Hoag, 84 U.S. 610, 623 (1873), on the basis of the aggregate view (“after all,
this artificial body is but the representative of its stockholders, and exists mainly for their benefit,
and is governed and controlled by them through the officers whom they elect”). See also
WILLIAM W. COOK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF STOCK AND STOCKHOLDERS 322 (New York
City, Baker, Voorhis & Co., Law Publishers 1887) [hereinafter COOK, LAW OF STOCK AND
STOCKHOLDERS]. However, in 1892 the Supreme Court of Minnesota held in Hospes v.
Northwestern Mfg. & Car Co.
This trust-fund doctrine . . . . is not sufficiently precise or accurate to constitute a safe foundation
upon which to build a system of legal rules . . . . Corporate property is not held in trust . . . .
Absolute control and power of disposition are inconsistent with the idea of a trust. The capital of
a corporation is its property . . . . [A] corporation is in law as distinct a being as an individual is,
and is entitled to hold property (if not contrary to its charter) as absolutely as an individual can
hold it.
48 Minn. 174, 192-193 (1892). The doctrine then fell into desuetude, reinforced by the invention
of no par stock in the early twentieth century. See Horwitz, supra note 82, at 207-14.
107.110 N.Y. 519, 532 (1888).
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sufficient as grounds for equity interference; for the powers entrusted
108
with corporate management are largely discretionary.

A year later the same court expanded this statement
All powers directly conferred by statute, or impliedly granted, of
necessity, must be exercised by the directors who are constituted by
the law as the agency for the doing of corporate acts. The expression
of the corporate will and the performance of corporate functions, in the
management of a corporation, may originate with its directors . . . .
Within the chartered authority they have the fullest power to regulate
the concerns of a corporation, according to their best judgment . . . . In
the management of the affairs of the corporation, they are dependent
solely upon their own knowledge of its business and their own
109
judgment as to what its interests require.

This rule became well established, so that by 1905 a court could write that
“it is [the board’s] judgment, and not that of its stockholders outside of the board
of directors . . . that is to shape [a corporation’s] policies or decide upon its
corporate acts. This principle is not disputed, and the citation of authorities in its
support is unnecessary.”110 The rule reflected the real entity view, which equates
the corporation with its management, and rejected the view of the corporation as
an aggregate of its shareholders.111
The one potential limitation on the power of the board was the ultra vires
doctrine, which held that a board could not act contrary to the powers conferred on
it by the state. The ultra vires doctrine thus represented the artificial entity view.
The doctrine originated in the pre- Civil War Era,112 but became prominent in the
arguments on the relationship of the state and the corporation in the 1880s and
1890s.113 The artificial entity argument for upholding the limitation was stated
clearly by the New York Court of Appeals in 1888:
In the granting of charters the legislature is presumed to have had in
view the public interest; and public policy is (as the interests of

108.Id.
109.Beveridge v. N.Y. Elevated R.R. Co., 112 N.Y. 1, 22 (1889).
110.Siegman v. Electric Vehicle Co., 140 F. 117, 118 (D.N.J. 1905); see also Manson v. Curtis, 223

N.Y. 313, 323 (1918) (“Directors are the exclusive, executive representatives of the corporation
and are charged with the administration of its internal affairs and the management and use of its
assets. Clearly the law does not permit the stockholders to create a sterilized board of directors.”
(citation omitted)).
111.It also represented a transition from an agency to a trustee model of the relationship between
shareholders and management. See Millon, supra note 10.
112.See, e.g., Abbott v. Am. Hard Rubber Co., 33 Barb. 578 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1861).
113.See generally COOK, LAW OF STOCK AND STOCKHOLDERS, supra note 105, at chs. 19, 38.
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stockholders ought to be) concerned in the restriction of corporations
within chartered limits, and a departure therefrom is only deemed
excusable when it cannot result in prejudice to the public or to the
stockholders. As artificial creations, they have no powers or faculties,
114
except those with which they were endowed when created . . . .
....
. . . Corporations are great engines for the promotion of the public
convenience, and for the development of public wealth, and, so long
as they are conducted for the purposes for which organized, they are a
public benefit; but if allowed to engage, without supervision, in
subjects of enterprise foreign to their charters, or if permitted
unrestrainedly to control and monopolize the avenues to that industry
in which they are engaged, they become a public menace; against
115
which public policy and statutes design protection.

The artificial entity doctrine was upheld by the Supreme Court the
following year:
It may be considered as the established doctrine of this court in regard
to the powers of corporations, that they are such and such only as are
conferred upon them by the acts of the legislatures of the several
States under which they are organized. A corporation in this country,
whatever it may have been in England at a time when the crown
exercised the right of creating such bodies, can only have an existence
under the express law of the State or sovereignty by which it is
created. And these powers, where they do not relate to municipal
corporations exercising authority conferred solely for the benefit of the
public, and in some sense parts of the body politic of the State, have in
this country until within recent years always been conferred by special
acts of the legislative body under which they claim to exist. But the
rapid growth of corporations, which have come to take a part in all or
nearly all of the business operations of the country, and especially in
enterprises requiring large aggregations of capital and individual
energy, as well as their success in meeting the needs of a vast number
of most important commercial relations, have demanded the serious
attention and consideration of law makers. And while valuable
services have been rendered to the public by this class of
organizations, which have stimulated their formation by numerous
special acts, it came at last to be perceived that they were attended by
many evils in their operation as well as much good, and that the hasty
manner in which they were created by the legislatures, sometimes with
exclusive privileges, often without due consideration and under the
116
influence of improper motives, frequently led to bad results.

114.Leslie v. Lorillard, 110 N.Y. 519, 531.
115.Id. at 533.
116.Oregon Ry & Navigation Co. v. Oregonian Ry, 130 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1889).
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The reference to corporate abuses relates to the rise of trusts, and indeed
the ultra vires doctrine was used to dissolve sugar and oil trusts under New York
and Ohio law.117 However, in 1895 the Supreme Court rejected an antitrust
challenge to the sugar trust on the grounds that the Sherman Act applied only to
corporations engaged directly in interstate commerce.118 And in 1896 the Court
rejected an ultra vires challenge on the ability of the Union Pacific Railway to
lease its tracks for 999 years to another railroad, when the charter would not
permit an outright sale.119 This literal decision significantly reduced the power of
the ultra vires doctrine.120
The ultimate demise of the doctrine resulted not from a court decision but
from the competition among states to attract corporate charters, which was begun
by New Jersey in 1890 and continued by Delaware in the 1900s.121 This
competition meant that New Jersey and Delaware had every incentive to relax any
limiting elements in their charters that restricted the power of corporate
management.122 Thus, for example, the long-lasting prohibition against
corporations owning stock in other corporations, which led to the necessity of
“trusts,” was eliminated by New Jersey in its 1896 law.123 As a result, although the
Supreme Court still held in 1899 that such a combination was ultra vires under

117.See People v. N. River Sugar Ref. Co., 121 N.Y. 582 (1890); State, ex rel. v. Standard Oil Co.,

49 Ohio St. 137, 184-85 (1892); see also WILLIAM COOK, THE CORPORATION PROBLEM 225
(1891); Theodore Dwight, The Legality of Trusts, 3 POLI. SCI. Q. 592 (1888).
118.United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1895).
119.Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Chi., Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co., 163 U.S. 564, 585 (1896).
120.See 2 William W. Cook, A Treatise on Stock and Stockholders, Bonds, Mortgages, and
General Corporation Law 971, 971-72 (3d ed. 1894) [hereinafter 2 Cook, Stock and
Stockholders] (“The courts are becoming more liberal, and many acts which fifty years ago
would have been held to be ultra vires would now be held to be intra vires.”). By 1898 Cook
wrote that “the doctrine of ultra vires is disappearing.” 1 William W. Cook, A Treatise on the
Law of Corporations Having a Capital Stock, at vii (4th ed. 1898) [hereinafter 1 Cook,
Corporations]. See also Horwitz, supra note 82, at 186-88 (discussing this development).
121.See RUSSEL CARPENTER LARCOM, THE DELAWARE CORPORATION 1-26 (1937); Edward Q.
Keasbey, New Jersey and the Great Corporations, 13 HARV. L. REV. 198, 201 (1899); Lincoln
Steffens, New Jersey: A Traitor State, 25 MCLURE’S MAGAZINE 41 (1905). On the “race to the
bottom/race to the top” debate, see generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the
Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV.
1435, 1444-46 (1992); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 664 (1974); Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm
Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525, 526-28 (2001); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder
Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 254-58 (1977).
122.See New Jersey Legislating for the United States, INDIANAPOLIS J. (Nov. 11, 1901); James B.
Dill, Address Before the Merchants’ Club of Chicago, Illinois: Trusts: Their Uses and Abuses
(Nov. 9, 1901).
123.General Corporation Act of New Jersey, N.J. Comp. Stat. § 51 (1896); see also id. § 104
(authorizing mergers); 1 COOK, CORPORATIONS, supra note 120, at vi.
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New York law, this holding became rather meaningless since most large, publicly
traded corporations were incorporated in New Jersey.124 As the New Jersey statute
explains, “[i]t was formerly the rule in this State that acts of a corporation in
excess of its express powers, or those necessarily implied, were void, and
contracts which were ultra vires the corporation were incapable of enforcement or
ratification. . . . This rule no longer obtains.”125
The decline of the ultra vires doctrine was sealed by the spread of
corporate laws permitting incorporation for “any lawful activity.”126 With the
doctrine gone, the artificial entity view of the corporation became less plausible,
and the real entity view reigned supreme again.127

1.3. The Hostile Takeover Crisis
In 1926, John Dewey published an article in the Yale Law Journal in which he
dismisses as irrelevant the debate among the aggregate, artificial entity, and real
entity views of the corporation.128 These views, he explains, could be deployed to
suit any purpose; and he uses examples relying on the cyclical nature of these
theories.129 His conclusion is that theory should be abandoned for an examination
of reality.130
Dewey was influential in that the theoretical debate on corporate
personality largely disappeared until the 1970s. As a practical matter, however,
the real entity view predominated for large, publicly traded corporations. The
board ran the corporation as it saw fit, protected from the shareholders by the
separation of ownership from management noted by Berle and Means in the
1930s131 and by the business judgment rule. The board was also protected from the

124.De la Vergne Refrigerating Mach. Co. v. German Sav. Inst., 175 U.S. 40, 52 (1899).
125.James B. Dill, The General Corporation Act of New Jersey 11 (1903).
126.Michael A. Schaeftler, Ultra Vires—Ultra Useless: The Myth of State Interest in Ultra Vires

Acts of Business Corporations, 9 J. CORP. L. 81, 89 (1983).
127.See Machen, supra note 99, at 260-61. Another significant development in this period was

states passing statutes that allowed a majority of shareholders to sell corporate assets (before the
1890s, shareholder unanimity was required). This greatly facilitated mergers and also represented
the decline of the aggregate view. See Horwitz, supra note 82, at 200-02.
128.John Dewey, The Historical Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655,
673 (1926).
129.Id. at 669.
130.Id. at 673.
131.Adolf A. Berle, Jr. & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property 4-5
(1932).
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state by the relaxation of corporate law limits begun by New Jersey and continued
by Delaware.132
The next significant practical change in this state of affairs only arose in
the 1980s. As a result of the invention of the junk bond market, it suddenly
became possible for hostile raiders to threaten takeovers of even the largest
corporations. After RJR Nabisco was taken private for $25 billion in 1988,133 it
was clear that no board was safe. As a result, debates on the nature of the
corporation and its relationship to the shareholders and the state, which began in
the academic literature in the 1970s, once again became a matter of practical
concern. And once again all three theories of the corporation reappeared, as can be
seen if one examines three seminal cases decided between 1982 and 1989 by the
Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Delaware.
Edgar v. MITE Corp.,134 decided by the Supreme Court in 1982, involved
the constitutionality of an anti-takeover act enacted by the state of Illinois.135
Under the Illinois Business Take-Over Act, a hostile tender offer for the shares of
a company covered by the act had to be registered by the Secretary of State, and
the offeror had to give both the target and the state a twenty-day notice during
which only the target could communicate with its shareholders regarding the
offer.136 The act applied both to corporations in which 10 percent of the
shareholders were residents of Illinois and to corporations that were either
incorporated in the state or had their principal office in it.137 The MITE
corporation made a hostile offer for an Illinois corporation and refused to comply
with the act, arguing that it violated the Commerce Clause.138
The Supreme Court agreed with MITE. Writing for a 5-4 majority, Justice
White held that the Illinois act was unconstitutional because it could apply to
tender offers that did not affect a single Illinois shareholder, specifically, that “the
State has no legitimate interest in protecting nonresident shareholders.”139
132.This state of affairs prompted Adolph Berle, the prime intellect behind the shareholder primacy

doctrine in the 1930s, to concede defeat in 1956:
Twenty years ago, the writer had a controversy with the late Professor E. Merrick Dodd, of
Harvard Law School, the writer holding that corporate powers were powers in trust for
shareholders while Professor Dodd argued that these powers were held in trust for the entire
community. The argument has been settled (at least for the time being) squarely in favor of
Professor Dodd’s contention.
See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., The 20th Century Capitalist Revolution 169 (1954).
133.Bryan Burrough & John Helyar, Barbarians at the Gate: The Fall of RJR Nabisco (1990)
(describing the $25 billion leveraged buyout of RJR Nabisco).
134.457 U.S. 624 (1982).
135.Id. at 626.
136.Id. at 634-35.
137.Id. at 627.
138.Id. at 627-28.
139.Id. at 644.
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Moreover, the fact that the target corporation was an Illinois corporation was
irrelevant since state regulation only applied to the corporation’s internal affairs:
“[t]ender offers contemplate transfers of stock by stockholders to a third party and
do not themselves implicate the internal affairs of the target company.”140 Instead,
the focus should be entirely on the impact of blocking the tender offer on the
company’s shareholders and their relationship with management:
The effects of allowing the Illinois Secretary of State to block a
nationwide tender offer are substantial. Shareholders are deprived of
the opportunity to sell their shares at a premium. The reallocation of
economic resources to their highest valued use, a process which can
improve efficiency and competition, is hindered. The incentive the
tender offer mechanism provides incumbent management to perform
141
well so that stock prices remain high is reduced.

This part of the opinion clearly reflects the aggregate view. The focus is
entirely on the impact on the corporation’s shareholders, and the corporation itself
(including its management) barely exists—as indicated by the statement that a
change in corporate control has no relevance to the internal affairs of the
corporation. The market for corporate control is praised because of its ability to
overcome the agency cost problem and the incentive it provides for management
to maximize stock prices. Moreover, White quotes the work of Easterbrook and
Fischel, who are among the principal proponents of the “nexus of contracts”
theory of the corporation, according to which the corporation is merely a
convenient legal term for a series of contracts, the most important of which is the
contract between shareholders and management.142
This part of the opinion, which rejects both the artificial entity and the real
entity theories, evoked some misgivings on the part of Justice Powell, even though
he joined to provide the crucial fifth vote.143 Powell noted that in some cases the
state may have a legitimate interest because the corporation has a real presence
that goes beyond a contract between management and the shareholders, reflecting
both the artificial and real entity views:
140.Id. at 645.
141.Id. at 643-44 (citations omitted).
142.See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in

Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1161, 1173-74 (1981); Daniel R. Fischel, The
Corporate Governance Movement, 35 Vand. L. Rev. 1259, 1273 (1982) (“A corporation . . . is
nothing more than a legal fiction that serves as a nexus for a mass of contracts which various
individuals have voluntarily entered into for their mutual benefit.”). The point that the nexus of
contracts theory is a reinvention of the aggregate view has been made repeatedly. See, e.g.,
William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from
History, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1471, 1478-79 (1989); Millon, supra note 10, at 229.
143.Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 646 (Powell, J., concurring).
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I join Part V-B because its Commerce Clause reasoning leaves some
room for state regulation of tender offers. This period in our history is
marked by conglomerate corporate formations essentially unrestricted
by the antitrust laws. Often the offeror possesses resources, in terms of
professional personnel experienced in takeovers as well as of capital,
that vastly exceed those of the takeover target. This disparity in
resources may seriously disadvantage a relatively small or regional
target corporation. Inevitably there are certain adverse consequences
in terms of general public interest when corporate headquarters are
moved away from a city and State.*
* The corporate headquarters of the great national and
multinational corporations tend to be located in the large cities
of a few States. When corporate headquarters are transferred
out of a city and State into one of these metropolitan centers,
the State and locality from which the transfer is made
inevitably suffer significantly. Management personnel—many
of whom have provided community leadership—may move to
the new corporate headquarters. Contributions to cultural,
charitable, and educational life—both in terms of leadership
and financial support—also tend to diminish when there is a
move of corporate headquarters.144

Five years later Powell had the opportunity to translate these misgivings
into an opinion for the Court that emphasized instead the artificial entity view of
the corporation. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America145 involved a so-called
“second generation” anti-takeover statute, i.e., one that was drafted to get around
the problems with the Illinois statute struck down in MITE.146 The Indiana statute
applied only to corporations incorporated in Indiana, which have specified levels
of shareholders within the state and which opt for its protection.147 Under the
statute, an acquirer who acquired “control shares” in such an Indiana target could
vote them only with the approval of a majority of the pre-existing disinterested
shareholders, to be obtained in a meeting within fifty days of the acquisition.148
The Court of Appeals followed MITE and declared the statute
unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause, because it interfered with the
market for corporate control:
Even if a corporation’s tangible assets are immovable, the efficiency
with which they are employed and the proportions in which the
earnings they generate are divided between management and

144.Id.
145.481 U.S. 69 (1987).
146.Id.
147.Id. at 72-73.
148.Id. at 73-75.
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shareholders depends on the market for corporate control—an
interstate, indeed international, market that the State of Indiana is not
149
authorized to opt out of . . . .

The Supreme Court reversed.150 Justice Powell, writing for a 5-4 majority,
stated
No principle of corporation law and practice is more firmly
established than a State’s authority to regulate domestic corporations,
including the authority to define the voting rights of shareholders . . . .
. . . We think the Court of Appeals failed to appreciate the significance
for Commerce Clause analysis of the fact that state regulation of
corporate governance is regulation of entities whose very existence
and attributes are a product of state law. As Chief Justice Marshall
explained:
“A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and
existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature
of law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of
its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to
its very existence. These are such as are supposed best
151
calculated to effect the object for which it was created.”

Powell thus rejected the view that states do not have the right to regulate
transactions affecting shareholders, including shareholders in other states. He
argued that the “free market system depends at its core upon the fact that a
corporation . . . is organized under, and governed by, the law of a single
jurisdiction. . . . A State has an interest in promoting stable relationships among
parties involved in the corporations it charters.”152 And he explicitly rejected the
market for corporate control, and its underlying aggregate theory:
The Constitution does not require the States to subscribe to any
153
particular economic theory. . . .
. . . [T]here is no reason to assume that the type of
conglomerate corporation that may result from repetitive
takeovers will result in more effective management or
154
otherwise be beneficial to shareholders. . . .

149.Id. at 77 (quoting Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 264 (7th Cir.

1986)).
150.CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. at 89.
151.Id. (quoting Trs. of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819)).
152.Id. at 90-91.
153.Id. at 92.
154.Id. at 92, n.13
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. . . [T]he very commodity that is traded in the “market for corporate
control”—the corporation—is one that owes its existence and
155
attributes to state law.

This entire opinion, with its quotation from Dartmouth College, is clearly
based on the artificial entity view that the corporation owes its existence to the
incorporating state and that the state may therefore regulate it, including in ways
that affect shareholders’ ability to sell their shares. Not surprisingly, Justice White
dissented, arguing that while the statute may help Indiana corporations,
“particularly in helping those corporations maintain the status quo,”156 it is
inimical to the interests of the shareholders and constitutes “economic
protectionism.”157
After CTS, the battle for corporate control moved to state law, and the
most important state in this regard was Delaware—the state in which most major
U.S. corporations are incorporated. Delaware law was favorable to hostile
takeovers until 1989, when the Supreme Court of Delaware issued an opinion in
Paramount v. Time , I n c . 158 that, in practice, ended the hostile takeover boom. 159
Paramount had made $175 (later raised to $200) per share offer (for Time) when
Time was about to enter into a $70 per share merger with Warner.160 Paramount
argued that under the previous decisions of the Delaware Supreme Court in
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.161 and Revelon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc.,162 Time was “up for sale,” and therefore, the business
judgment rule was suspended and Time’s board was required to maximize
shareholder value by accepting the much higher Paramount bid.163
The Delaware Supreme Court held in favor of Time. It stated
Two key predicates underpin our analysis. First, Delaware law
imposes on a board of directors the duty to manage the business and
affairs of the corporation. This broad mandate includes a conferred
authority to set a corporate course of action, including time frame,
designed to enhance corporate profitability. Thus, the question of
“long-term” versus “short-term” values is largely irrelevant because
directors, generally, are obliged to charter a course for a corporation
which is in its best interests without regard to a fixed investment
horizon. Second, absent a limited set of circumstances as defined
155.Id. at 94.
156.Id. at 98.
157.Id. at 100.
158.571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
159.See id. at 1155.
160.Id. at 1147-49.
161.493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
162.506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
163.Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1142.
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under Revlon, a board of directors, while always required to act in an
informed manner, is not under any per se duty to maximize
shareholder value in the short term, even in the context of a
164
takeover.

The court thus rejected the view that maximizing short-term shareholder
value was always required. Instead, the board was permitted to pursue its view of
the best long-term corporate strategy:
Delaware law confers the management of the corporate enterprise to
the stockholders’ duly elected board representatives. The fiduciary
duty to manage a corporate enterprise includes the selection of a time
frame for achievement of corporate goals. That duty may not be
delegated to the stockholders. Directors are not obliged to abandon a
deliberately conceived corporate plan for a short-term shareholder
profit unless there is clearly no basis to sustain the corporate
165
strategy.

Thus, the board was permitted to prefer preservation of the “Time
culture”—its stated goal over maximizing the cash return to shareholders. This
effectively killed the takeover threat, because any board could find good longterm share-value maximization reasons to reject a superior cash bid. The Delaware
court, thus enhancing managerial power, in effect endorsed the real entity view: a
corporation was an entity with its own corporate culture, which should not be
subordinated to the shareholders or to the state. This view was ratified when the
ALI corporate governance project adopted a rule that corporate boards may take
into account the interests of other “stakeholders,” not just the shareholders.166
Why did the real entity view prevail? The obvious answer was that
corporate management determines the state of incorporation, and therefore the
Delaware Supreme Court felt that it had to side with management once the U.S.
Supreme Court had approved the anti-takeover laws of other states, lest
corporations choose to relocate there. However, it seems unlikely that this was the
only reason; Delaware is very well established as the preferred state of
incorporation,167 and stock values would likely decrease if shareholders perceive
that management was leaving Delaware just to protect itself. Instead, it seems
likely that the Delaware Supreme Court genuinely believed that a corporation like
Time had a corporate existence and culture with implications for other
164.Id. at 1150 (citation omitted).
165.Id. at 1154 (citations omitted).
166.1 Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations § 2.01(b)(3) illus. i.

(1994).
167.Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 Va. L. Rev.

757, 842-45 (1995).
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stakeholders, and therefore rejected the aggregate view equating the corporation
with its shareholders. In that way, its concerns were similar to those raised by
Justice Powell in his concurrence in MITE: a corporation is more than a “nexus of
contracts,” and courts and legislatures are allowed to take the interests of other
stakeholders into account.168

1.4. From National Corporations to Multinational
Enterprises
The last transformation in the nature of the corporation began in the 1950s and is
still on-going, so that its ultimate outcome is hard to judge. This is the
transformation from corporations based mostly in one country to multinational
enterprises based in many countries.
Multinationals, in the sense of corporations owning assets overseas, have
existed since the seventeenth century.169 However, as recently as the 1950s, the
shareholders (and other sources of capital), the management, most of the
production facilities, and most of the markets of even large multinationals tended
to be in one country, so that, essentially, what was good for G.M. was good for
America.170
Since the 1990s, however, this has changed profoundly.171 As more
countries opened up to foreign direct investment, communications improved, and
many products became lighter and easier to ship, more and more corporations
became “globalized.” In a globalized multinational, the sources of capital are in
many countries. The shares of large multinationals trade on as many as twenty
exchanges, and borrowing facilities are similarly diversified. Research and
development and production facilities are likewise spread around the globe, as are
markets. The only thing that usually ties a modern multinational to its home
country is the location of management.172
In this context, the debate over the nature of the corporation has re-opened.
There is abundant academic writing on the relationship between multinationals
and the state, and most writers from both left and right concede that this
relationship has changed profoundly so that the home state—the state of
incorporation—has become powerless to control “its” multinationals; it is hard

168.See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
169.See Harris, supra note 20, at 39-59.
170.Robert Reich, Who is US? 90 Harv. Bus. Rev. 53, 54 (1990).
171.Id.
172.Id. at 53-54.
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even to identify to which country multinationals “belong.”173 On a practical level
this situation has led to attempts by home states to control the behavior of
multinationals abroad in areas as diverse as trading with the enemy, antitrust,
corruption and others, with varying success.174 The most recent development in
this regard is “inversion” transactions, in which the management changes the
country of incorporation of a multinational’s parent corporation.175 These
transactions are undertaken primarily for tax reasons, but they have corporate
governance implications as well.176 Specifically, the artificial entity theory
becomes hard to maintain when management can pick weak countries like
Bermuda as the country of incorporation for the parent of a multinational.
The relationship with shareholders has also undergone changes as
shareholders now tend to come from many countries. One implication of this has
been that the securities laws of the weakest country tend to dominate because of
cross-country price arbitrage.177 Another implication is academic proposals to let
management choose the country of securities law as well as the country of
incorporation.178 On a practical level, globalization has led the SEC to relax
requirements for some foreign issuers.179 This trend has tended to weaken the
applicability of the aggregate view as well. It is hard to predict where these trends
will lead, but at the moment they appear once more to favor the real entity view.

173.Edward M. Graham & Paul R. Krugman, Foreign Direct Investment in the United States 86-93

(3d ed. 1995); Reich, supra note 172. But see Laura D’Andrea Tyson, They Are Not Us: Why
American Ownership Still Matters, Am. Prospect, Winter 1991, at 37-38.
174.See Raymond Vernon, In the Hurricane’s Eye: The Troubled Prospects of Multinational
Enterprises 30-51 (1998); see also Peter T. Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law
114-17, 385 (2d ed. 2007); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, National Regulation of Multinational
Enterprises: An Essay on Comity, Extraterritoriality, and Harmonization, 42 Colum. J.
Transnat’l L. 16-20 (2003) [hereinafter Avi-Yonah, National Regulation]; Blumberg, supra note
56, at 169.
175. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, For Haven’s Sake: Reflections on Inversion Transactions, 95 Tax
Notes 1793, 1793-94 (2002) [hereinafter Avi-Yonah, For Haven’s Sake].
176.Id. at 1794. For the congressional response, see I.R.C. § 7874 (2005).
177.See Amir N. Licht, “Regulatory Arbitrage for Real: International Securities Regulation in a
World of Interacting Securities Markets”, 38 Va. J. Int’l L. 563, 631-37 (1998).
178.See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & Andrew Guzman, “Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the
International Reach of Securities Regulation”, 71 S. Cal. L. Rev. 903, 907, 947-48 (1998);
Roberta Romano, “Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation”, 107
Yale L.J. 2359, 2362 (1998). But see Merritt B. Fox, “Retaining Mandatory Securities
Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice is Not Investor Empowerment”, 85 Va. L. Rev. 1335, 1338
(1999).
179.See Merritt B. Fox, “The Political Economy of Statutory Reach: U.S. Disclosure Rules in a
Globalizing Market for Securities”, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 696, 707, 709-11 (1998).
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1.5. Conclusion
Throughout all the transformations we have studied, the same pattern recurs. As
the relationship of the corporation to the state, to society and to its members or
shareholders changes, all three views of the corporation emerge, submerge and
then re-emerge in a slightly different but fundamentally similar form. In the end,
however, the real entity view prevails.
Why does the real entity view prevail? This is no doubt due in part to the
fact that it represents the most congenial view to corporate management, because
it shields them from undue interference from both shareholders and the state.
Corporate management wields political power and it influences the outcome of the
debate; judges again and again refer to the importance of corporations, by which
they mean corporate management. But the very fact that corporate management
wields this power shows that there is another reason why the real entity view
prevails: it fits reality much more than the other two. In some periods (e.g., the
Roman Empire or eighteenth century Europe) the power of the state was
overwhelming, and the artificial entity view seemed plausible. In other periods
(the medieval membership corporation or the nineteenth century close
corporation), the aggregate view seemed plausible. But for a majority of the time,
equating the corporation either with the state or with shareholders must have
seemed to most non-academics highly implausible.180 The real entity view
180.The real entity view is clearly the dominant one in sociology and some branches of economics.

As one sociologist has stated, “[t]he recurrent problem in sociology is to conceive of corporate
organization, and to study it, in ways that do not anthropomorphize it and do not reduce it to the
behavior of individuals or of human aggregates.” Guy E. Swanson, The Tasks of Sociology, 192
Science 665, 666 (1976). A whole branch of economic sociology centers on the study of
organizations, and there are numerous books devoted to the topic. Most of these books revolve
around the study of large corporations, since these are the dominant forms of organization in this
society. See, e.g., The Handbook of Economic Sociology pt. 2, sec. C (Neil J. Smelser & Richard
Swedberg eds., 1994); The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Walter W. Powell
& Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991); Jeffrey Pfeffer & Gerald R. Salancik, The External Control of
Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective (Stanford Univ. Press 2003) (1978); W.
Richard Scott, Organizations: Rational, Natural, and Open Systems (5th ed. 2003); James D.
Thompson, Organizations in Action: Social Science Bases of Administrative Theory (Transaction
Publishers 2003) (1967). Moreover, they are informed by the economic perspective inaugurated
by Ronald Coase in his classic “Nature of the Firm” article from 1937 and developed by Oliver
Williamson and others into transaction cost economics. See generally R. H. Coase, The Nature of
the Firm, 4 Economica 386 (1937); Oliver E. Williamson, “Transaction Cost Economics and
Organization Theory”, in The Handbook of Economic Sociology, supra note 166, at 77. For a
critique of Williamson’s theory see Mark Granovetter, “Economic Action and Social Structure:
The Problem of Embeddedness”, 91 Am. J. Soc. 481 (1985). This branch of economics, which
now forms part of the “new institutional economics,” begins by recognizing that the firm is
fundamentally different from the market because of its hierarchical structure, and proceeds to
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prevailed because it was more real than the others. And this observation enables
us to move from the historical to the contemporary and ask how Citizens United
and its antecedents fit the historical pattern.

2. Citizens United: A Real Entity Case
The Supreme Court first addressed the question whether corporations had a right
to engage in political speech under the First Amendment in First National Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti,181 decided in 1978.182 Bellotti involved a Massachusetts statute
that prohibited banks and business corporations from expending funds on
advertising to influence the result of political referenda.183 In the context of a
referendum to introduce progressive taxation on individuals, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court held that the law was constitutional because the First
Amendment rights of corporations are limited to issues that “materially affect its
business, property, or assets.”184
The Supreme Court reversed.185 The three opinions in the case reflect the
three theories of the corporation. Justice Powell, for a five Justice majority,
adopted the real entity view, stating
If the speakers here were not corporations, no one would suggest that
the State could silence their proposed speech. It is the type of speech
indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy, and this is no less
true because the speech comes from a corporation rather than an
individual. The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity
for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its
186
source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual.

The majority thus treated corporations as equivalent to individuals, citing
Santa Clara for the proposition that corporations are persons for Fourteenth
Amendment purposes and therefore protected by the First Amendment (as applied
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the states).187 It explicitly rejected the
investigate when operating as a firm as opposed to buying in the market makes sense (the “make
or buy” issue). Transaction cost economics has become the leading explanation for the most
recent transformation of the corporation—the rise of multinational enterprises. See generally The
Nature of the Transnational Firm (Christos N. Pitelis & Roger Sugden, eds., 1991).
181.435 U.S. 765 (1978).
182.Id. at 765.
183.Id. at 767-68.
184.Id. at 767, 769.
185.Id. at 767.
186.Id. at 777.
187.Id. at 780 & n.15.
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artificial entity theory advanced by Massachusetts (“corporations, as creatures of
the State, have only those rights granted them by the State”),188 because the
national banks that brought the case were “creatures of federal law . . . and their
existence is in no way dependent on state law.”189 The majority also explicitly
rejected the aggregate view that the intent of the statute was to protect
shareholders from management expressing different views than their own, stating
that the normal “procedures of corporate democracy” are sufficient to protect
them.190
The heart of Justice Powell’s opinion lies in his concern that upholding the
Massachusetts statute would infringe on corporate activities that he viewed as
beneficial, but unrelated to corporate business operations. He stated: “Thus
corporate activities that are widely viewed as educational and socially constructive
could be prohibited. Corporations no longer would be able safely to support—by
contributions or public service advertising—educational, charitable, cultural, or
even human rights causes.”191 And Justice Powell rejected as unsupported by the
record the view that “corporations are wealthy and powerful and their views may
drown out other points of view.”192 This also reflects the real entity view because
corporations are judged as standing on their own, not as reflecting the views of
shareholders or as creatures of the state. The aggregate view, as reflected in
Milton Friedman’s writings from the same period, would object to the same kind
of “corporate social responsibility” considerations as not being in the
shareholders’ interests.193
Justice White’s dissent, on the other hand, advanced the aggregate view.
He argued
There is now little doubt that corporate communications come within
the scope of the First Amendment. This, however, is merely the
starting point of analysis, because an examination of the First
Amendment values that corporate expression furthers and the threat to
the functioning of a free society it is capable of posing reveals that it is
not fungible with communications emanating from individuals and is
subject to restrictions which individual expression is not. . . .
Shareholders in [for-profit corporate] entities do not share a common
set of political or social views, and they certainly have not invested
their money for the purpose of advancing political or social causes or

188.Id. at 778-79 & n.14.
189.Id.
190.Id. at 794.
191.Id. at 782 n.18.
192.Id. at 789.
193.See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y.

Times, Sept. 13, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 33.
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in an enterprise engaged in the business of disseminating news and
opinion. . . .
Of course, it may be assumed that corporate investors are united by a
desire to make money, for the value of their investment to increase.
Since even communications which have no purpose other than that of
enriching the communicator have some First Amendment protection,
activities such as advertising and other communications integrally
related to the operation of the corporation’s business may be viewed as
a means of furthering the desires of individual shareholders. This
unanimity of purpose breaks down, however, when corporations make
expenditures or undertake activities designed to influence the opinion
or votes of the general public on political and social issues that have
no material connection with or effect upon their business, property, or
assets. Although it is arguable that corporations make such
expenditures because their managers believe that it is in the
corporations’ economic interest to do so, there is no basis whatsoever
for concluding that these views are expressive of the heterogeneous
beliefs of their shareholders whose convictions on many political
issues are undoubtedly shaped by considerations other than a desire to
endorse any electoral or ideological cause which would tend to
increase the value of a particular corporate investment. This is
particularly true where, as in this case, whatever the belief of the
corporate managers may be, they have not been able to demonstrate
that the issue involved has any material connection with the corporate
business. Thus when a profitmaking corporation contributes to a
political candidate this does not further the self-expression or selffulfillment of its shareholders in the way that expenditures from them
194
as individuals would.

This is clearly an aggregate view, and it is congruent with the position
taken by Justice White in MITE four years later.195 The emphasis is entirely on the
shareholders, not on the corporation itself.
Justice Rehnquist, on the other hand, dissented from an artificial entity
perspective. He stated that although the Fourteenth Amendment does protect
corporations, there are limits to such protection because the corporation is a
creature of the state.196 Citing Dartmouth College, he stated:
The appellants herein either were created by the Commonwealth or
were admitted into the Commonwealth only for the limited purposes
described in their charters and regulated by state law. Since it cannot
be disputed that the mere creation of a corporation does not invest it
with all the liberties enjoyed by natural persons . . . our inquiry must

194.Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 804-06 (White, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
195.See supra Part I.C.
196.Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 823 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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seek to determine which constitutional protections are “incidental to
197
its very existence.”
There can be little doubt that when a State creates a corporation with
the power to acquire and utilize property, it necessarily and implicitly
guarantees that the corporation will not be deprived of that property
absent due process of law. Likewise, when a State charters a
corporation for the purpose of publishing a newspaper, it necessarily
assumes that the corporation is entitled to the liberty of the press
essential to the conduct of its business. . . . Although the Court has
never explicitly recognized a corporation’s right of commercial
speech, such a right might be considered necessarily incidental to the
business of a commercial corporation.
It cannot be so readily concluded that the right of political expression
is equally necessary to carry out the functions of a corporation
organized for commercial purposes. A State grants to a business
corporation the blessings of potentially perpetual life and limited
liability to enhance its efficiency as an economic entity. It might
reasonably be concluded that those properties, so beneficial in the
economic sphere, pose special dangers in the political sphere.
Furthermore, it might be argued that liberties of political expression
are not at all necessary to effectuate the purposes for which States
permit commercial corporations to exist. So long as the Judicial
Branches of the State and Federal Governments remain open to protect
the corporation’s interest in its property, it has no need, though it may
have the desire, to petition the political branches for similar protection.
Indeed, the States might reasonably fear that the corporation would
use its economic power to obtain further benefits beyond those already
bestowed. I would think that any particular form of organization upon
which the State confers special privileges or immunities different from
those of natural persons would be subject to like regulation, whether
the organization is a labor union, a partnership, a trade association, or
a corporation.
....
I can see no basis for concluding that the liberty of a corporation to
engage in political activity with regard to matters having no material
effect on its business is necessarily incidental to the purposes for
which the Commonwealth permitted these corporations to be
organized or admitted within its boundaries. Nor can I disagree with
the Supreme Judicial Court’s factual finding that no such effect has
been shown by these appellants. Because the statute as construed
provides at least as much protection as the Fourteenth Amendment
198
requires, I believe it is constitutionally valid.

197.Id. at 823-24 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v.

Woodward, 4 Wheat. 463, 489 (1819)).
198.Id. at 824-28 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Rehnquist rejected the argument

that some of the corporations were not chartered by Massachusetts by pointing out that they were
all permitted to do business there. Id. at 824 n.2.
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The positions taken by Justices Rehnquist and White clearly reflect the
artificial entity and aggregate views. But the majority taking the real entity view
prevailed, presumably because in 1978 it was hard to view corporations as a mere
aggregation of their shareholders or as mere creatures of the state. Surprisingly,
the majority opinion was written by Justice Powell, who, as we have seen, took an
artificial entity view in MITE and CTS.199 The explanation is that the hostile
takeover movement threatened the same educational and charitable activities of
corporations that Powell sought to defend in Bellotti, so in that context he needed
to empower the state to save “its” corporations.
The emphasis on the artificial entity view in CTS may also have influenced
the result in the Court’s next First Amendment case related to corporations, Austin
v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce,200 decided three years after CTS.201 The
issue in Austin was whether a state could ban corporate-direct expenditures in
support of or in opposition to candidates for state office, as opposed to
expenditures through “Political Action Committees” (PACs) organized for this
purpose.202 Justice Marshall, for a six Justice majority that included Rehnquist and
White, held that the ban was constitutional.203 The majority opinion reflects the
artificial entity view held by Rehnquist:
State law grants corporations special advantages—such as limited
liability, perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the accumulation
and distribution of assets—that enhance their ability to attract capital
and to deploy their resources in ways that maximize the return on their
shareholders’ investments. These state-created advantages not only
allow corporations to play a dominant role in the Nation’s economy,
but also permit them to use “resources amassed in the economic
marketplace” to obtain “an unfair advantage in the political
marketplace.” . . . the political advantage of corporations is unfair
because
“[t]he resources in the treasury of a business corporation . . . are
not an indication of popular support for the corporation’s
political ideas. They reflect instead the economically motivated
decisions of investors and customers. The availability of these
resources may make a corporation a formidable political
presence, even though the power of the corporation may be no
204
reflection of the power of its ideas.”

199.See supra Part I.C.
200.494 U.S. 652 (1990).
201.Id.
202.Id. at 654-55.
203.Id. at 668.
204.Id. at 658-59 (citations omitted) (quoting FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238,

257-58, 1986).
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We therefore have recognized that “the compelling governmental
interest in preventing corruption support[s] the restriction of the
influence of political war chests funneled through the corporate
205
form.”
The Chamber argues that this concern about corporate domination of
the political process is insufficient to justify a restriction on
independent expenditures. Although this Court has distinguished these
expenditures from direct contributions in the context of federal laws
regulating individual donors, it has also recognized that a legislature
might demonstrate a danger of real or apparent corruption posed by
such expenditures when made by corporations to influence candidate
elections . . . . Michigan’s regulation aims at a different type of
corruption in the political arena: the corrosive and distorting effects of
immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of
the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public’s
support for the corporation’s political ideas. . . . We emphasize that the
mere fact that corporations may accumulate large amounts of wealth is
not the justification for § 54; rather, the unique state-conferred
corporate structure that facilitates the amassing of large treasuries
warrants the limit on independent expenditures. Corporate wealth can
unfairly influence elections when it is deployed in the form of
independent expenditures, just as it can when it assumes the guise of
political contributions. We therefore hold that the State has articulated
a sufficiently compelling rationale to support its restriction on
206
independent expenditures by corporations.

Why did the majority emphasize the artificial entity view? It may have
been influenced by the adoption of that view in CTS. However, it is more likely
that what really bothered Justice Marshall was “the corrosive and distorting effects
of immense aggregations of wealth”207 per se, but he could not take that position
because it was rejected as to rich individuals by Buckley v. Valeo.208 In his dissent,
Justice Scalia pointed out the weakness of the majority’s position, stating that
while the state charters corporations, “[i]t is rudimentary that the State cannot
exact as the price of those special advantages the forfeiture of First Amendment
rights,”209 and that the aggregation of wealth argument is inconsistent with
Buckley.210 Justice Brennan also felt that the majority was on weak ground, and in
his concurrence took the aggregate view that the purpose of the statute is to
205.Id. at 659 (quoting FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 500-01,

1985).
206.Id. at 659-61 (citations omitted).
207.Id. at 660.
208.This rejection was explicitly recognized by Justice Stevens in Davis v. FEC, No. 07-320, slip

op. at 2 & n.1 (U.S. 2008) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
209.494 U.S. at 680 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist.

No. 205, Will Cnty., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958)).
210.494 U.S. at 680 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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protect dissenting shareholders.211 Justice Kennedy in his dissent rejected both the
aggregate and the artificial entity views, relying on Bellotti to argue (in
accordance with the real entity view) that corporations are equal to individuals,
and therefore their speech must be protected.212
We thus arrive at the most recent addition to the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence on the corporate form, Citizens United.213 The question presented in
that case was whether Congress could impose the same kind of limits on
corporations that Michigan state law applied in Austin.214 The Court could have
ruled narrowly that the limits were unconstitutional as applied to a nonprofit
corporation formed for advocacy purposes by individuals, but decided instead to
use the case as the foundation for a much broader ruling that all corporate direct
expenditures are permitted under the First Amendment, overruling Austin.215
What is remarkable about Citizens United, although maybe not surprising
to the reader at this point, is that both the majority and the dissent adopted the real
entity view of the corporation, so that their only disagreement was in divergent
assessments of the implications for the First Amendment. The majority opinion by
Justice Kennedy emphasized, for example, that the ban on corporate speech was
not alleviated by the fact that a PAC organized and controlled by the same
corporation could speak freely because “[a] PAC is a separate association from the
corporation.”216 This assertion can only be made under the real entity view
because under the aggregate view both the corporation and the PAC are owned by
the same ultimate shareholders, and under the artificial entity view both the PAC
and the corporation are created by the same state.
The majority relies on Bellotti for the proposition that “the First
Amendment does not allow political speech restrictions based on a speaker’s
corporate identity.”217 It rejects the “antidistortion” rationale of Austin as
overbroad and inconsistent with Buckley, and as permitting the government to ban
speech by media corporations.218 The aggregate view advanced by the Solicitor
General and by Justice Brennan in his concurrence in Austin is likewise rejected in
reliance on the “procedures of corporate democracy” of Bellotti.219 Interestingly,
the majority does not even mention the artificial entity view, even though it (and
not the antidistortion rationale per se) was key to the holding in Austin. While the
statute at issue is a federal one, and corporations are chartered by states, it could
211.Id. at 674-78 (Brennan, J., concurring).
212.Id. at 699 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
213.Citizens United v. FEC, No. 08-205, slip op. (U.S. Jan. 21, 2010).
214.Id. at 1.
215.Id. at 12, 49-50.
216.Id. at 21.
217.Id. at 31 (citing First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978)).
218.Id. at 34-35, 46.
219.Id. at 46 (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 794).
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be argued that the federal government also confers benefits on business
corporations by protecting the market that enables them to engage in business.220
Justice Scalia, in concurrence, did admit that the First Amendment was
originally intended to apply to individuals, “[b]ut the individual person’s right to
speak includes the right to speak in association with other individual persons.”221
But this does not mean that he adopted the aggregate view, since that view, as
applied to the shareholders, underlays the principal argument of the Government
and was soundly rejected by the majority.222 Instead, what Scalia meant was
presumably corporate management working together as an association of persons
“to exclude or impede corporate speech is to muzzle the principal agents of the
modern free economy. We should celebrate rather than condemn the addition of
this speech to the public debate.”223
Nor does the dissent attempt in Citizens United to advance any view other
than the real entity view. Instead, it emphasizes that corporations are different than
natural persons and therefore may be more heavily regulated:
In the context of election to public office, the distinction between
corporate and human speakers is significant. Although they make
enormous contributions to our society, corporations are not actually
members of it. They cannot vote or run for office. Because they may
be managed and controlled by nonresidents, their interests may
conflict in fundamental respects with the interests of eligible voters.
The financial resources, legal structure, and instrumental orientation of
corporations raise legitimate concerns about their role in the electoral
process. Our lawmakers have a compelling constitutional basis, if not
also a democratic duty, to take measures designed to guard against the
potentially deleterious effects of corporate spending in local and
224
national races.

This is all about the corporation itself, not about the shareholders or the
state. Similarly:
The same logic applies to this case with additional force because it is
the identity of corporations, rather than individuals, that the
Legislature has taken into account. As we have unanimously observed,
legislatures are entitled to decide “that the special characteristics of the
corporate structure require particularly careful regulation” in an

220.This argument was made to justify a federal tax on state-chartered corporations as early as

1909. See Avi-Yonah, Corporations, supra note 77, at 1218; see also Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S.
43, 74-75 (1906).
221.Citizens United, No. 08-205 at 7 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted).
222.Id. at 8 (Scalia, J., concurring).
223.Id. at 9 (Scalia, J., concurring).
224.Id. at 2 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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electoral context . . . . Campaign finance distinctions based on
corporate identity tend to be less worrisome, in other words, because
the “speakers” are not natural persons, much less members of our
political community, and the governmental interests are of the highest
order. Furthermore, when corporations, as a class, are distinguished
from noncorporations, as a class, there is a lesser risk that regulatory
distinctions will reflect invidious discrimination or political
225
favoritism.

Not a word is written here on the corporation’s relationship to the state or
to the shareholders. The artificial entity theory is discussed later in the dissent, but
purely in a historical context: when explaining the Framers’ view of corporations,
Justice Stevens emphasized their relationship to the state.226 But he emphasized
that this was a historical artifact that disappeared with general incorporation
statutes, and that “many legal scholars have long since rejected the concession
theory of the corporation.”227 He mentioned briefly the artificial entity rationale for
Austin, but did not emphasize it in comparison with corporate power.228
The dissent also addressed the aggregate theory at the very end when
discussing the dissenting shareholder rationale of Brennan’s concurrence in
Austin, but only as a limited and secondary argument “beyond the distinctive legal
attributes of the corporate form.”229 The main emphasis in this section of the
dissent was on the weakness of the “procedures of corporate democracy.”230 This
is very far from viewing the corporation as a mere “nexus of contracts” with the
primary contract being that with the shareholders.231
The entire Citizens United opinion, both the majority and the dissent, are
thus reflective of the real entity view. Corporations stand on their own,
independent of both the state that created them and the shareholders that own
them. The debate between the majority and the dissent is about what follows from
this perspective on corporations. In the majority’s opinion, this means that
corporations are speakers just like individuals and entitled to the same First
225.Id. at 32-33 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted) (quoting

FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 209-10 (1982)).
226.Id. at 36. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Corporations were created,

supervised, and conceptualized as quasi-public entities”).
227.Id. at 36-37, 41 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
228.Id. at 47-48 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
229.Id. at 89 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
230.Id. at 87-88 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Margaret M. Blair

& Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 Va. L. Rev. 247, 320 (1999))
(voting and shareholder derivative suits are “so limited as to be almost nonexistent” and selling
the stock faces many practical difficulties).
231.See Fischel, supra note 135, at 1273 (“A corporation . . . is nothing more than a legal fiction
that serves as a nexus for a mass of contracts which various individuals have voluntarily entered
into for their mutual benefit.”).
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Amendment protection, while the dissent takes the view that because of the
special characteristics of corporations, they have more limited First Amendment
rights.232 The dissent remarks:
The fact that corporations are different from human beings might seem
to need no elaboration, except that the majority opinion almost
completely elides it. Austin set forth some of the basic differences.
Unlike natural persons, corporations have “limited liability” for their
owners and managers, “perpetual life,” separation of ownership and
control, “and favorable treatment of the accumulation and distribution
of assets . . . that enhance their ability to attract capital and to deploy
their resources in ways that maximize the return on their shareholders’
investments.”233 Unlike voters in U.S. elections, corporations may be
foreign controlled. Unlike other interest groups, business corporations
have been “effectively delegated responsibility for ensuring society’s
economic welfare”234; they inescapably structure the life of every
citizen. “‘[T]he resources in the treasury of a business corporation,’”
furthermore, “‘are not an indication of popular support for the
corporation’s political ideas.’”235 “‘They reflect instead the
economically motivated decisions of investors and customers. The
availability of these resources may make a corporation a formidable
political presence, even though the power of the corporation may be
no reflection of the power of its ideas.’”236
It might also be added that corporations have no consciences, no
beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, no desires. Corporations help
structure and facilitate the activities of human beings, to be sure, and
their “personhood” often serves as a useful legal fiction. But they are
not themselves members of “We the People” by whom and for whom
our Constitution was established.237
....
It is an interesting question “who” is even speaking when a business
corporation places an advertisement that endorses or attacks a
particular candidate. Presumably it is not the customers or employees,
who typically have no say in such matters. It cannot realistically be
said to be the shareholders, who tend to be far removed from the dayto-day decisions of the firm and whose political preferences may be

232.Citizens United, No. 08-205 at 2 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
233. Id. at 75 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Austin v. Mich.

Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658-59 (1990)).
234.Id. at 75 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Milton C. Regan, Jr.,

Corporate Speech and Civic Virtue, in Debating Democracy’s Discontent 289, 302 (Anita L.
Allen & Milton C. Regan, Jr. eds., 1998)).
235. Id. at 75 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at
659 (quoting FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 258 (1986))).
236. Id. at 75-76 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at
659 (quoting FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 258 (1986))).
237. Id. at 76 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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opaque to management. Perhaps the officers or directors of the
corporation have the best claim to be the ones speaking, except their
fiduciary duties generally prohibit them from using corporate funds for
personal ends. Some individuals associated with the corporation must
make the decision to place the ad, but the idea that these individuals
are thereby fostering their self-expression or cultivating their critical
faculties is fanciful. It is entirely possible that the corporation’s
electoral message will conflict with their personal convictions. Take
away the ability to use general treasury funds for some of those ads,
and no one’s autonomy, dignity, or political equality has been
238
impinged upon in the least.

It is hard to imagine a more forceful statement of the real entity view:
actual human beings disappear almost completely. In a footnote, Justice Stevens
does acknowledge the existence of other theories of the corporation, but it is clear
which theory he favors.239 The artificial entity theory advanced by Justice
Rehnquist in Bellotti, and relied upon by the majority in Austin, and the aggregate
theory advanced by Justice White in Bellotti and Justice Brennan in Austin have
almost disappeared, and both the majority and the dissent take the real entity view.
Like so many times before, the real entity view reigns supreme once again.

Conclusion: What’s Next?
As the reader can expect by now, it is hardly likely that this state of affairs will
remain stable forever. When the next transformation in the status of corporations
is addressed by the Court, it is inevitable that the artificial entity and aggregate
theories of the corporation will re-emerge to once again contend with the real
entity view. In fact, one can see this process germinating even now within Citizens
United.

238.Id. at 75-77 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
239.Justice Stevens writes:

Nothing in this analysis turns on whether the corporation is conceptualized as a grantee of a state
concession, a nexus of explicit and implicit contracts, a mediated hierarchy of stakeholders, or
any other recognized model. Austin referred to the structure and the advantages of corporations
as “state-conferred” in several places, but its antidistortion argument relied on only the basic
descriptive features of corporations, as sketched above. It is not necessary to agree on a precise
theory of the corporation to agree that corporations differ from natural persons in fundamental
ways, and that a legislature might therefore need to regulate them differently if it is human
welfare that is the object of it concern.
Citizens United, 08-205 at 76 n.72 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal
citations omitted) (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 660, 665, 667).
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An important rhetorical comment made by Justice Stevens in his dissent,
and echoed by other critics of the decision (like President Obama in the State of
the Union address),240 is its impact on the rules restricting foreigners from
participating in U.S. elections. Justice Stevens stated that the majority’s approach
“would appear to afford the same protection to multinational corporations
controlled by foreigners as to individual Americans.”241 This drew a strong
disclaimer from the majority, arguing that even if the Government has a
compelling interest in limiting foreign influence over our political process, the
corporate expenditure ban is overbroad because it “is not limited to corporations
or associations that were created in foreign countries or funded predominantly by
foreign shareholders.”242
Predictably, Congress will react by reaffirming that the ban on
contributions and expenditures made by foreign nationals applies to foreign
corporations.243 But how will Congress define what is a foreign corporation?
The majority in Citizens United envisaged two possibilities. One was to
define foreign corporation as a corporation created by a foreign state.244 This
approach is one taken by our tax laws, and it follows the artificial entity view.245
The problem, of course, would be that if this were the only definition, it would be
too easy for foreigners to become Americans merely by incorporating a shell in
one of the states.
The other approach mentioned by the majority was to take the aggregate
view and look at the identity of the shareholders, so that a corporation the majority
of whose shareholders are U.S. citizens will count as American and others as
foreign.246

240.President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 2010) in 156 CONG. REC. H418

(daily ed. Jan. 27, 2010) (“[L]ast week, the Supreme Court reversed a century of law that I
believe will open the floodgates for special interests—including foreign corporations—to spend
without limit in our elections.”).
241.Citizens United, No. 08-205 at 33 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
242.Id. at 47.
243.See 2 U.S.C. section 441(e)(2006). The DISCLOSE Act, introduced by Sen. Schumer and Rep.
Van Hollen, defines foreign corporation as any corporation incorporated overseas and any
domestic corporation that is either 20 percent owned or de facto controlled by foreign nationals,
which is a combination of all three views. See H.R. 5175, S. 3295 (111th Cong. Sess. 2), § 102.
244.Citizens United, No. 08-205 at 47.
245.See I.R.C. § 7701(a)(4), (5), (30) (2006). But see I.R.C. § 7874(a)(2)(B) (defining some
foreign corporations as domestic based on the identity of their shareholders).
246.Citizens United, No. 08-205 at 47.
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This may work for closely held corporations. For example, this approach is
used in determining foreignness for purposes of the rules restricting foreign
ownership of media and transportation corporations.247 But for publicly traded
multinational enterprises, the aggregate view is very difficult to maintain because
the shares trade on multiple exchanges, the ownership is constantly shifting, and
most of the owners trade under “street names” that make it very hard even for the
IRS to know their true identities. Thus, I predict that the same reasons that forced
the Court to abandon the aggregate view for diversity jurisdiction will apply in
this context as well.
A third possibility would be to take the real entity view and confront
directly the question of whether corporations in a globalized world have a
meaningful nationality. As discussed above this issue is extensively debated and
reasonable minds can differ.248 It lies at the heart of the current transformation of
the corporate form from mainly national to multinational enterprises that do not
owe any particular allegiance to any state.
Whatever the ultimate outcome of this debate, it is already possible to
predict that once again the real entity definition of the nationality of corporations,
which focuses on where they are “managed and controlled,” will triumph over a
narrow focus on the creating state, too remote and manipulable, and the
shareholders, too remote and diffused.249 To be continued…

247.See Gregory P. Cirillo & Christopher M. Mills, Federal Restrictions on Foreign Participation

in Commercial Aviation and Related Fields, in 2 MANUAL OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES 1, 11-13 (J. Eugene Marans et al., eds., 3d ed. 2004); Christina H. Burrow et al.,
Foreign Investment in the United States Communications Industry, in 2 MANUAL OF FOREIGN
INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, supra at 247.
248.See Reich, supra note 169, at 53-54; Tyson, supra note 172, at 37-38.
249.“Managed and controlled” is a familiar definition of corporate residency from the tax laws of
many countries, relying on a U.K. House of Lords decision from the nineteenth century. See
REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH ET AL., GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON TAX LAW (forthcoming 2010)
(manuscript at 195-96) (on file with author). Justice Stevens seems to take this view because he
speaks of corporations “managed and controlled” by foreigners. See Citizens United, No. 08-205 at
2 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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